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1. Introduction
It was part of Tim Berners-Lee’s original vision for the World Wide Web
(Berners-Lee, 2002) that it would shortly evolve into a so-called ‘Seman-
tic Web’, which would (famously) replace a “web of links” with a “web
of meaning”. The enormous work that has gone into trying to realize this
vision raises (for the astute observer) fascinating philosophical questions,
most notably: What does it mean to ‘give’ Web pages meaning? The question
is philosophical, but the domain of Information Technology (IT) renders
investigation of it fascinatingly concrete. It thus supplies an ideal oppor-
tunity to apply Peirce’s “pragmatic maxim”, which urges that to better un-
derstand abstract concepts (such as ‘meaning’) it is most helpful to think
about their specific applications.
Many complex and technical discussions of meaning have taken place
in philosophy over the past 400 years. However such debates have al-
most all shared a basic set of assumptions about meaning which is most
unhelpful from an engineering perspective. We call this the “Cartesian
Framework for Understanding Meaning”. Terrain on the far side of these
assumptions is only just being glimpsed (and understood as inviting) with
the help of Peirce. This paper will outline the Cartesian framework for
meaning (section 2), then the Peircean alternative (section 3), then, after
a quick sketch of the semantic web project (section 4), trace some of the
differing strategies and results which these two broad approaches may be
perceived to bring about (sections 5 and 6).
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2. The Cartesian framework for understanding meaning
Key idea: The meaning of a sign is the intention of its producer. This
‘intention’ has 2 key features, which form the basic assumptions of the
Cartesian framework:
i) It is private. It has a location somehow ‘in’ a person’s mind. The in-
tention’s physical location is not the key issue, though, it is that only the
producer of the sign has knowledge of it. For Descartes, it was so inaccessi-
ble as to constitute a non-physical substance – hence the famous ‘Cartesian
dualism’.
ii) It is incorrigible. I am the ultimate authority on what the signs I pro-
duce mean. They mean what I intend them to mean. (This is sometimes
referred to as a claim of ‘first-person authority’ with respect to meaning.)
Although Descartes doesn’t discuss meaning explicitly in his Medita-
tions, these views are extracted from what he says about ideas, which for
him are the basic building blocks of thought and meaning. InMeditation II
(Descartes, 1996), he claims that we only have direct access to the world
of our ideas, that things in the world are quite separate from the ideas
that accurately or falsely represent them. Thus for Descartes the mind is
methodologically disconnected from the world so much so that he claimed
to doubt whether the entire external world even exists and the ultimate au-
thority on what its ideas mean. Error is possible, but not about what one’s
ideas mean, only about the way they are put together to form a representa-
tion of reality.
Later philosophers in the so-called ‘earlymodern period’, such as Locke
and Hume, embraced a naturalistic empiricism, and gave up Descartes’ du-
alistic understanding of mind as a separate substance from matter. How-
ever they retained his concept of the idea (private and incorrigible) as the
basic unit of meaning. Thus Locke states:
[W]ords, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing
but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them.
Locke, 1994: 3, II, ii
In the 19th century Frege rejected the early modern understanding of
meaning in terms of ideas. He pointed out that the any word, for instance
‘dog’, can be associated with many different, bizarre ideas in the minds of
different people (disturbing ideas of being attacked, happy memories of
working at the local pound, and so on). For the purposes of logic, Frege
wanted a concept of meaning that could be definable more objectively, that
could make a distinction between how people actually do understand the
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meaning of a sign and how they should understand it in order to grasp true
propositions.
He therefore claimed that associated with every term was a “sense”
(Sinn), which existed over and above its “reference” (Bedeutung). This
‘Sinn’, was an abstract object, common to everyone who grasps the mean-
ing of a term. He sometimes referred to it as the ‘mode of presentation’ of
the sign’s reference. Thus Frege gave up the privacy of the Cartesian model
of meaning. However he seems to have kept the incorrigibility. For how
can I be wrong about the ‘mode of presentation’ which I associate with a
given term?
Frege dreamed that with his new ‘concept-script’ he might enable a
newly clear and objective understanding of the meaning of all our signs.
He hoped it would then be possible to build all knowledge into an inte-
grated taxonomic system which was deductively complete. (This dream was
of course shattered by Russell’s Paradox.) Frege’s insights helped to shape
twentieth century philosophy’s so-called “linguistic turn”, which shifted
from seeingmeaning as an ‘idea-world relationship’ to seeing it as a ‘word-
world relationship’ (Hacking, 1975). Such theories were played out with
many variations: for instance, Quine tried to do away with the concept of
meaning altogether for behaviorist reasons, without success, Davidson de-
veloped an account of the meaning of propositions in terms of their ‘truth-
conditions’, a theory which was then vastly complicated and sophisticated
via the technical concept of possible worlds. But the one aspect of the Carte-
sian picture that still went unchallenged was its incorrigibility. For, it was
thought, surely I know what the signs I use mean?1
3. A Peircean alternative framework for understanding meaning
Key Idea: The meaning of a sign is the process of interpretation which
occurs as the sign is used. Peirce denied both the privacy and the incorrigi-
bility of the Cartesian framework. In its relationship between the sign (idea
or word) and the thing in the world, the Cartesian framework possessed
an essentially dyadic structure. (Frege nearly escapes this dyadicity by pos-
tulating a sense as well as a reference for every sign. However given that
1 To be strictly accurate, this assumption was finally challenged in the 1970s in the dis-
covery of so-called ‘a posteriori necessities’ – for example ‘water’, it is claimed, ‘means’ H2O
whether its users know that water is H2O or not. However this erudite debate is of limited
application to the Semantic Web and will be ignored (for further details, however, see Legg,
2005).
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sense for him is an abstract object, logically speaking he has arguably re-
placed a single dyadic relationship with two dyadic relationships.) Peirce’s
triadicmodel of the sign, by contrast, consists in an irreducible relation be-
tween three elements:
Representamen
(e.g. “tree”)
Object
(e.g. trees)
Interpretant
(e.g. further uses of
“tree” to mean trees)
Fig. 1: Peirce: Structure of a sign.
The representamen is the actual signifying item. The object is what the sign
refers to in the world. The interpretant, however, is Peirce’s original addi-
tion to understanding meaning. It consists in further uses of the same sign
to represent the same object. This is just to say that a sign must represent
an object in such a way that it is understood and used again. For example,
imagine that I decide to name a new star. This will not work unless other
people learn the name and use it to pick out the same star. If I just stare at
the night-sky, pick a name, and tell no-one about it, the process is literally
meaningless, for Peirce, whatever my intentions.
Note that the interpretants, although they pick out the same object as
the original sign, can ‘interpret’ that object in ways that differ to some de-
gree from the ways it was interpreted originally. That is, they can not just
continue but also add to, or even shift the meaning of the sign. One classic
example is the word ‘atom’ as used by Democritus, and by us. Etymo-
logically, in ancient Greek ‘a-tom’ meant something that cannot be broken
up, but of course we have now ‘split the atom’. Yet in some sense we are
arguably still talking about the same things Democritus was, and the tran-
sition from the ancient to the present meaning was not clean or discrete.
Thus by contrast to the Cartesian framework, we now have corrigibility
with respect to meaning. The intention of the sign’s producer is no longer
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the ultimate authority –whenDemocritus talked of ‘atoms’, hemeantmore
than he knew.
Onemight ask at this point: Sowhat is the realmeaning of the sign? The
original or the ultimate interpretation? However, do we have to choose?
Peirce’s theory raises the possibility that we do not. Arguably now it is
more helpful to understand meaning not as an object (whose ‘properties’
can be argued over and had better not be contradictory), but as a process. In
some real sense the meaning of a sign is what that sign does – how it spreads
and grows (if, indeed, it does spread and grow). Thus, Peirce wrote (in a
striking anticipation of contemporary use of the word ‘virtual’):
no present actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning,
any intellectual value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but
in what this thought may be connected with in representation by sub-
sequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether some-
thing virtual. EP 1:42
Note how this account renders meaning public. In the Cartesian frame-
work, to really know what a sign means, you would need to get into the
head of its producer (which alas is not possible). In the Peircean frame-
work, to know what a sign means, look at what people are doing with it.
Thus the responsibility for the meaning of a sign resides in a whole com-
munity. Relatedly, Peirce derived his account of truth by idealizing over
this process of developing and using signs in a ‘community of inquiry’,
a view which has been widely criticized as insufficiently objective. Yet
Peirce denied this, claiming that over the long-run, within a broad enough
community, sign-use was intrinsically self-correcting. It is also important
to note that what the community is ‘doing with’ a given sign is not just
what they are ‘doing with it in their heads’ by thinking about it, but what
kinds of practical activities they are scaffolding with its help. Consider for
instance, the term ‘potting mix’. For Peirce it is part of its very meaning
that people actually buy a certain brown stuff, put it in pots and insert
plants in it.
As co-founder of the new predicate logic, Peirce pursued a vision in-
terestingly different to Frege’s regarding how it should advance human
knowledge. As a pragmatist Peirce thought Frege’s attempt to explicitly
formalize the entire meaning of signs impossible, for an irreducible dimen-
sion of the meaning of any sign, such as ‘tree’, is the effects which an agent
situated in the world would experience in relevant situations, such as tree-
climbing, botanical investigations of new tree species, and so on, and not
all of these can be anticipated in advance. In short, then, Peirce replaces a
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static model of meaning-as-object with a new dynamic model of meaning-
as-process, where what a sign means is open to view (public), able to shift
and change over time (corrigible), and inextricably entwined with actual
tasks and projects.
4. The Semantic Web: an overview
4.1 Goals and challenges
Semantic Web developers embrace a wide variety of goals, including
(from lesser to greater ambitiousness):
• disambiguating ‘merely syntactic’ Web searches, for instance distin-
guishing “Turkey” the country from “Turkey” the bird
• finding ‘semantic joins’ in databases
• indexing text and semantic markup together in order to improveWeb
retrieval performance (to turn the entireWeb into one enormous ‘dis-
tributed database’)
• enabling software agents to interpret the meaning of websites in or-
der to solve a wide range of arbitrarily complex tasks (from docu-
ment-search to scheduling doctor’s appointments)
Challenges for implementing it may be divided into ‘technical’ and ‘hu-
man’. Technical challenges include inferential tractability, logical consis-
tency, and the rapid changeability of information on the Web. The human
challenges are equally problematic, and include: “Who will mark up Web
pages with the required semantic metadata?”, and “Who gets to say what
that metadata means”?
4.2 Basic technologies
Semantic web development so far has centered around two new mark-
up languages, which however by themselves are not sufficient to create a
‘Web semantics’.
1) XML. XML was initially conceived of as a simple way to send docu-
ments across the Web, allowing authors to define their own tags, and thus
document formats, subject to a simple syntax. Each new tag is linked to
some unique ‘namespace’. Though the term ‘namespace’ might suggest
some further document which includes definitions for the tags, in practice
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it is often just a naked URI, essentially only a way of indexing different tags
uniquely via prefixes.
Anyone can define an XML namespace. So how do they relate to each
other, semantically-speaking? Do two tags fromdifferent namespaces have
the same meaning if they consist of the same character-string? No, for I
could define a <pine> tag in my namespace to ‘mean’ pine trees, while a
<pine> tag in another namespace is designed to apply to pine wood and
anything made from it. Thus each namespace’s tags are assumed to be
distinct in meaning, and translating between them is a further problem.
Thus XML arguably only provides ‘syntactic’ interoperability at best. This
should not be too surprising since XML was not designed to share mean-
ing so much as ‘document format’, a concept which includes any kind of
structure within data (e.g. that a document contains just four elements).
Semantic web developers’ desire to represent meaning more purely and
explicitly led to the development of RDF.
2) RDF. RDF stands for ‘Resource Description Framework’. Strictly
speaking, RDF is not a language but a data-model. In a key advance on
XML, RDF introduces propositional structure. Each RDF ‘proposition’ has
three parts, sometimes referred to as ‘subject’, ‘predicate’ and ‘object’ (e.g.
Beckett 2004; Swartz, 2002), and sometimes as ‘object’, ‘attribute’, and
‘value’ (e.g. Decker et al, 2000). As an example, take the proposition: The
Kauri is a kind of pine tree. Here the subject/object would be
‘Kauri’, the predicate/attribute would be ‘a kind of’, and the object/value
would be ‘pine tree’.
Does marking up web pages with RDF propositions make the Web ‘se-
mantic’? In the example above, a propositional structure exists, with all
three components envisaged to be assigned URIs. However we have seen
that URIs are merely indices. Once again, RDF does not determine what
they are indexed to. As Sowa has written:
By standardizing the notations, XML and RDF take an important first
step, but that step is insufficient for data sharing without some way of
comparing, relating, and translating the vocabularies. Sowa, 2000
5. Cartesian approaches to web semantics
Key idea: Try to define an authoritative sign-producer’s intention for
what each sign should mean. If one believes that the meaning of a sign re-
sides in what the user of a sign intends it to mean, it would appear that the
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way to give the Web meaning is to try to define that intention, in machine-
readable fashion, as fully and determinately as possible. This thinking has
resulted in many attempts to set up silos of meaning, also known as ‘formal
ontologies’. Some key examples will now be discussed.
1) RDFS. RDF Schema, an extension of RDF, allowed one to declare
classes, and properties, populate classes with instances, and organize them
into a subsumption hierarchy. It also allowed range and domain con-
straints to be added to properties, and properties to be ascribed to indi-
viduals. It was initially envisaged that web-semantics-defining ontologies
would be stored in this language. However, RDFS turned out to be too
logically simple to express a great deal of what one might wish to say to
authoritatively define the meanings of terms. Though one can declare new
classes and populate themwith instances, one cannot say anything further
about these classes and instances (Delteil et al, 2001). For instance, one
cannot state that two names denote the same person. At the end of the
day RDFS is still just a set of terms indexed via namespaces whose further
meaning is opaque. RDFS was never widely used and its main components
are now folded into the more expressive OWL (see next).
2) OWL. OWL (‘Web Ontology Language’) was a renaming and rework-
ing of DAML+OIL. It became a W3C Recommendation in February 2004
and is currently the flagship ontology of the W3C group. OWL goes beyond
RDFS by providing additional vocabulary and a formal semantics. The ad-
ditional vocabulary includes the ability to define classes in terms of logical
relationships between other classes, the ability to state class cardinality,
equality (for both classes and individuals), and logical characteristics of
properties. It was hoped that this greater expressivity would enable it to
outdo RDFS in capturing all information needed to define the semantics of
terms on the web. Greater expressivity has costs in inferential tractability,
however, so OWL has three versions, each an extension of the previous:
OWL Lite, OWL DL and OWL Full.
The W3C envisaged that once they provided the OWL language, the
world would respond by defining and contributing ontologies, and a num-
ber of ontology libraries/clearing-houses have been set up for this pur-
pose (for instance: the DAML ontology library http://www.daml.org/
ontologies/, and the Protégé ontology library http://protege.cim.
net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?ProtegeOntologiesLibrary). However at present
coverage is patchy at best. For instance regarding our test-concept, ‘tree’,
a search on Swoogle, UMBC’s ontology search engine (http://swoogle.
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umbc.edu), produces just a fewvery scattered assertions.2 It would thus ap-
pear that OWL is not currently widely used outside the academic research
context (though OWL DL is used more than the other two).
There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, it is clumsy and ver-
bose: the OWL translation of, “A student is a person who is enrolled in at
least one thing” runs to 10 complex nested lines. Secondly, it is complained
that its graph/tree data-structure does not scale for real-world applica-
tions foundering for example, when dealing with the information in a typ-
ical business spreadsheet (Bergman, 2006), nor does it allow user-defined
datatypes. Finally, the exact formal relationship between OWL and RDF is a
delicate matter. While OWL Full can be viewed as an extension of RDF, OWL
Lite and OWL DL can only be viewed as extensions of a restricted view of
RDF. (McGuinness and van Harmelen, 2004). This creates a problem for
layering OWL over RDF. From the Peircean perspective, however, OWL’s
most fundamental issue is the ‘human’ one: its current lack of use.
3) CYC. The original (yet continuing) most ambitious formal ontology
project of all is the Cyc project (http://www.cyc.com). It has deep roots
in classical AI. It is most ambitious in terms of size (over 600 000 cate-
gories), depth of knowledge (over 2 million axioms), and time devoted to
it (over 700 person-years) (Sowa, 2004). It has its own purpose-built infer-
ence engine, and natural language interface. The Cyc project is the most
systematic, unified attempt to not just index terms but to describe their
meanings in machine-readable terms. Thus its representation of a tree,
#$Tree-ThePlant, is distinguished from #$Tree-PathSystem. It comes
with axiomatic assertions (for instance, “A tree is largely made of wood”)
and rules (for instance, “If a tree is cut down, then it will be destroyed”),
from which further facts can be deduced (for instance, “If the pine tree
in my backyard is cut down, then it will be destroyed.”). It manages to
bypass the W3C’s problems with layering OWL on RDF, by using its own
in-house language, the purpose-built CycL (which has the expressivity of
higher-order logic).
The company has made strenuous efforts to position itself for the Se-
mantic Web, by for instance mapping in databases such as FIPS (Federal In-
2 For example, “A Tree is a kind of LandscapeProduct” in
http://individual.utoronto.ca/hesham/Ontology/IPDLite.owl, and nothing else,
“A TreeRing is a kind of Vegetation” in
http://sweet.jpl.nasa.gov/ontology/biosphere.owl, and nothing else. These assertions
are mixed with many others concerning trees as mathematical structures, with no obvious
way of telling that this is a different concept.
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formation Processing Standards), the CIA WorldFactbook (Reed & Lenat,
2002), and WordNet, and producing automated OWL annotation of text
documents (Witbrock et al, 2004). Nevertheless, once again, unfortunately
Semantic Web developers outside the company have so far made little use
of this ontology. Its system of categories is extremely complex, requiring
philosophical training to understand. Inferential tractability is a particu-
lar worry given the expressivity of the CycL language, and the monolithic
holism of such a giant ontology unfortunately leads to brittleness.
In conclusion, then, the attempts of these formal ontology projects to
‘create ex nihilo’ the meaning of signs on the semantic web via a set of an-
tecedent definitions misunderstand what it is for something to have mean-
ing. From a Peircean perspective the mere fact that these projects are not
widely used is the key argument against their having real ‘significance’.
6. Peircean approaches to web semantics
Key idea: Build applications which allow interpretants to freely grow,
within whatever communities choose to use them. What is growing right
now on the Web? Some developments manifestly are. (These are some-
times referred to as the ‘lower-case semantic web’, by contrast to the W3C’s
official efforts):
1) Tagging. Tags are labels added to the Web voluntarily by users. On-
tologically speaking, the practice is entirely uncontrolled – no categories
are prepared or agreed upon in advance. (Thus a given CD might be
labelled “boring”, “Mike_likes_this”, “driving_music”, and “songs_
about_fish”). Tagging began as a way of labelling web-pages with words
or phrases meaningful to oneself in order to rediscover them quickly, but
has spread to embrace a number of other much more public uses, as a va-
riety of websites has emerged to serve as tag clearing-houses. Examples of
such sites include del.icio.us. for tagged bookmarks (http://del.icio.us/)
and Flickr for tagged photographs (http://www.flickr.com/).
Tagging is said to produce not a taxonomy (in the sense of a mark-up
according to a pre-given ontology) but a ‘folksonomy’ (Weinberger, 2005).
Despite the ‘feral’ source of tags, it has been argued that at the level of the
entire Web the impact of individual idiosyncrasy lessens, and that, “[b]y
forgoing formal classification, tags enable a huge amount of user-produced
organizational value, at vanishingly small cost” (Shirky, 2005).
2) RSS autodiscovery. This technology ‘syndicates’ websites (frequently
weblogs) by providing summaries of their content, links to the full version,
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and other meta-data, in an XML file called an RSS feed. Content is filtered
for individual users using keywords (the choice of which once again is
wholly personal and idiosyncratic).
3) Collaborative websites. These provide a medium in which speakers
of any language define, describe and discuss topics of contemporary rele-
vance. The resulting information is freely available, electronically encoded
and conveniently presented. Suchwebsites are quickly springing up on ev-
ery conceivable subject, for instance: music (http://musicbrainz.org/),
exercise ( http://www.favoriterun.com/ ) and biosecurity (http://paipm.
cas.psu.edu/biosecurity.html), to give just a few examples. One of the
original and most impressive websites, however, and by far the most com-
prehensive, is the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia. This project is a re-
markable and unanticipated realisation of Peirce’s ‘community of inquiry’,
its ever-increasing level of accuracy causing considerable surprise in those
who do not hold to Peirce’s theory of truth (but a sense of vindication in
those who do).
6.1 A case-study in semantics extraction from user-supplied web
content
Wikipedia’s immense potential as an automated, just-in-time source of
semantic knowledge, by contrast to manually encoded, ‘frozen’ silos of
meaning, is just beginning to be explored scientifically. Each web page/
article inWikipedia defines a specific concept and is inter-linkedwith other
articles in the encyclopaedia. Milne et al. (2006) extract a thesaurus by
treating article names as terms and hyperlinks as semantic relations be-
tween them. By looking at different types of links, they are able to iden-
tify three types of semantic relations that are commonly used in manually
crafted thesauri:
• Synonymy/Polysemy – Redirect pages in Wikipedia link synonymous
phrases to the same article (e.g. ‘Pine tree’ is linked to ‘Pine’). Dis-
ambiguation pages help to identify ambiguous terms (e.g. ‘Tree’ as
‘woody plant’ and ‘Tree’ as ‘data structure’, along with 14 other pos-
sible senses)
• Hierarchical relations –Wikipedia’s category structure defines relations
between broader and narrower concepts (e.g. ‘Pine’ belongs to the
category ‘Pinaceae’, which is in turn a part of the category ‘Plant fam-
ilies’)
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• Associative relations – Any other hyperlinks connecting article pages
are association between the concepts of different strength. (e.g. On
the page ‘Pine’ there are links to articles ‘pine nuts’, ‘evergreen’,
‘christmas trees’ and ‘parks’)
In this way they concretely demonstrate how a semantic knowledge base
can be created on-the-fly, tailored to any document collection. Figure 2
demonstrates an example, where a mini-version of a thesaurus was ex-
tracted given merely Wikipedia and the following short document:
“Tane Mahuta is New Zealand’s tallest Kauri Tree, growing in Waipoua
Forest. Its massive smooth, grey-white trunk rises 59 feet before a branch
appears.”
Thick lines represent hierarchical relations, thin lines are association
relations; dotted lines reflect polysemy relations to homonyms. Note the
detail of this result by contrast to the random and patchy coverage of cur-
rent OWL ontologies. Furthermore, this semantic structure reflects public
opinion on the relatedness between document terms, it reflects an up-to-
the-minute version of it, and the restriction to a particular document guar-
antees that all included terms are relevant for this particular knowledge
domain.
Given a large agricultural document collection and a thesaurus Agro-
voc, manually created to cover the same domain, Milne et al. report that
Wikipedia coversmore than twice asmany document concepts as Agrovoc.
Figure 2. Thesaurus extracted from Wikipedia for a sample document.
7. Conclusion
Cartesians assume that in order tomake the SemanticWeb happen it is nec-
essary tomake a huge defining effort, to somehow encode for the computer
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the private intentions we have when we produce signs. The Peircean ap-
proach by contrast involves realizing that vast quantities of semantic data
already exists on the Web, our job is to work out how to leverage it. It might
be objected that it is difficult to envisage how any kind of coherent infer-
encing might be built on such a turbulent and amateur base as (is most
of) this user-supplied metadata. Still, these criticisms might be made of
Google’s deployment of its spectacularly successful page-rank algorithm
across the turbulent and amateur World Wide Web. Google’s genius was
to realize that it did not need to pay people to inspect and rate websites,
as such data already existed in the form of hyperlinks. In Peircean terms,
we can say that Google realized that hyperlinks constitute interpretants of
the web-pages they link to. For in most cases such links indicate that the
creator of the linking page thought that their page was in some sense rel-
evant to, and thus about the same thing (object) as the linked-to page. In
a similar way, then, tags can be considered as interpretants of the web-
pages they describe, blog syndications as interpretants of the blogs syndi-
cated, Wikipedia entries as interpretants of the terms defined, and so on.
The kinds of inferencing that will trace such interpretants and transform
them into semantic data is not the neat, deductivist rule-based reasoning
of ‘good old fashioned AI’. We need new models.
Having mentioned AI, it’s worth noting that here also philosophical
theories of meaning are not mere abstract speculation but directly influ-
ence what we envision and attempt to build. This is not surprising since
the Semantic Web at its most boosterish arguably consists in many old AI
goals in 1990s dress (Halpin, 2004). The classic 1950s-era model of AI –
something like a digital encyclopedia in the head of a robot – may now
be seen as a poignant attempt to make concrete the Cartesian picture of
meaning as idea in the head. By contrast, Peirce’s account of meaning as
interpretants led him to write, “just as we say that a body is in motion, and
not that motion is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and
not that thoughts are in us.” (EP 1:42 fn.). In this sense, perhaps as with
‘Web semantics’ also with ‘Web intelligence’ we already have more at our
disposal than we realize.3
3 A considerably revised and expanded version of this paper is forthcoming in Semiotica,
under the title “Peirce, Meaning and the Semantic Web”.
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